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This article reviews literature on the transformation of the soviet enterprise and its 
management. The review shows that soviet management was much more multidimensional 
than previously assumed on the basis of official management descriptions. According to the 
official descriptions, the position of the soviet manager mainly corresponded to that of the 
plant director who was responsible for the internal production processes of the factory. 
However, in reality, a soviet manager’s field of duties expanded from internal production 
management to struggling against the shortages of the centrally planned economy.  
 
Correspondingly, the review on transformation literature indicates that some of 
the empirical studies suffer from a rather inadequate methodology, as they tend 
to study enterprises and their management only at one point in particular time. 
Regardless of this, they sometimes draw very strong conclusions on 
transformation. In other words, several studies are based on a certain 'commonly 
accepted' view of Soviet management, instead of truly analysing the 
transformation taking place in post-Soviet companies.  
 
As previous empirical studies have not reached an unambiguous conclusion on 
the important topics linked to successful transformation, the article proposes 
some essential themes, which could increase understanding on the 
organisational and managerial transformation, and hence support the overall 
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  1THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOVIET ENTERPRISE 






“Managers of post-communist enterprises 
have to assume … a leadership role in the 
milieu of sudden discontinuity and dramatic 
change. They are the only ones potentially 
capable of translating changes in the macro-
economic environment into corresponding 
micro-economic behavior of the firms. 
Otherwise, transformation to a market 
economy will not happen.” 
 
Andrzej K. Kozminski (1993) Catching Up? 
Organizational and Management Change in 
the Ex-Socialist Block, p. 145 
 
  21.  Introduction to the Transformation of the Enterprise Sector 
in the Former Soviet Union 
 
The abolition of state monopoly and the development of company 
legislation caused an enterprise boom in the former Soviet Union 
(FSU). To illustrate the rapid expansion of the enterprise sector, the 
Russian enterprise population which has grown by 15 times can be 
taken as an example. According to Blasi et al. (1997, 25), “at the 
beginning of 1991 the Russian Federation had approximately 23,766 
mid-sized and large industrial enterprises and 170,000 smaller ones, 
mostly retail shops”. By the beginning of 1999, the number of 
registered enterprises was over 2.9 million (RSC, 1999). In addition to 
these three million registered organisations, several million 
unregistered ones are estimated to operate in the former Soviet Union. 
“Estimates suggest that additional 2-3 million small undertakings 
exist [in Russia alone] but remain unregistered” (EBRD, 1996, 170)
1.  
 
Although the number of enterprises has multiplied, the expansion of 
the enterprise sector has not increased economic output of the former 
Soviet republics, but on the contrary, it has decreased considerably. 
For instance, real gross domestic product (GDP) of the FSU in 1998 
amounted only to approximately 60 per cent of the 1989 level. In 
addition, the transformation has caused a fall in industrial production. 
For example, the industrial production of Russia had fallen to half of 
the 1991 level by 1996. Despite the fall of industrial production, in 
some former Soviet republics industry still plays a leading role in the 
economy. For example, in Belarus and Russia the share of the 
industry in GDP was some 40 per cent in 1997 (BF, 1997; EBRD, 
1998).  
 
One of the main reasons for the deep decline in economic output was 
the disintegration of the Soviet production network. Correspondingly, 
the decrease in the relative importance of industry is mainly due to the 
fact that the Soviet economy overemphasised industrial production 
and respectively neglected the development of services. The neglect 
of services in the Soviet era was one reason for the service sector and 
the retail trade to witness an enterprise boom. For example, the 
  3enterprises registered within trade amounted nearly to 30 per cent of 
all registered enterprises in Russia in 1996 (Liuhto, 1998a). 
 
A natural consequence of the abolition of state monopoly on 
enterprise activity was the decreasing role of the state in the economy. 
The shift from state-determined enterprise activity to privately driven 
entrepreneurship is not only caused by privatisation of state 
enterprises  per se but rather by the foundation of new private 
enterprises. For instance in Estonia, only 7 per cent of all private 
enterprises were created directly as a result of privatisation. However, 
it is necessary to keep in mind that some of these new private 
enterprises were established especially in order to use the 
opportunities created by privatisation (Purju, 1998). 
 
In Russia the share of state and municipal companies in 1996 was less 
than one-fourth and in Estonia only few per cent of the enterprise 
sector. Despite the relatively small number of state companies, they 
still play a rather significant role in the former Soviet economies. In 
the mid-1998, the non-private sector share stood at approximately 80 
per cent at its greatest (Belarus) and, at its lowest, at 30 per cent 
(Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia) of GDP (SOE, 1996; EBRD, 1996; 
1998; Liuhto, 1998a). 
 
In addition to the liberalisation of enterprise activity, the abolition of 
state monopoly in foreign trade has been another major means of 
transforming the Soviet enterprise sector. Due to liberalised foreign 
trade, enterprises can handle their foreign trade independently from 
the intermediary of the state-led foreign trade associations. As a 
consequence, the structure and geographical distribution of foreign 
trade have changed. The share of consumer goods has increased 
considerably, and correspondingly the proportion of investment goods 
has decreased. Furthermore, the geographical distribution of foreign 
trade has altered: the West has replaced the former Soviet republics 
and socialist countries (WIIW, 1998). 
 
In addition to the liberalisation of foreign trade, the former Soviet 
republics have been integrated into the world economy through 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Although enterprises from capitalist 
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1987, their enthusiasm to do so remained fairly low until the collapse 
of the centrally planned economy. By the beginning of the 1990’s 
only approximately 1000 foreign-owned enterprises had been 
registered in the FSU, whereas Russia and the Baltic States alone had 
approximately 60,000 - 70,000 registered enterprises with foreign 
ownership by 1996
2. The cumulative FDI inflow to the FSU was 
about USD 28 billion between 1989 and 1998, of which the Baltic 
States covered 15 per cent (Katila, 1990; Laurila, 1993; EBRD, 1997). 
 
Besides the investment inflow to the former USSR, it is necessary to 
note that enterprises in the late Soviet economy are integrating into 
the world market through the Eastern investment in other transition 
countries or even in the West
3. Although there are only few studies on 
the internationalisation of the post-Soviet companies, the empirical 
findings indicate that the post-Soviet companies have been relatively 
passive in investing abroad though they have expressed their interest 
in investing especially in other former Soviet republics (Liuhto, 
1998a). According to Sôrg and Ivanova (1999, 1), “… the prospects of 
the Estonian banks for internationalisation are promising but the 
results up today are modest and one-sidedly directed towards the 
East”.  
 
The collapse of the centrally planned economy has had a surprising 
effect on the regional dimension of enterprise activities. Although a 
strong expansion from economic centres towards rural areas after the 
Soviet era might have been anticipated, statistics do not support this 
assumption. In Russia, the importance of the capital city is 
considerable in entrepreneurial activity. Approximately one fourth of 
enterprises were registered in the Moscow region by the beginning of 
1998. Such centralisation in the capital region may be explained by 
the more rapidly growing economic activity in capital cities. For 
example, in Russia over 50 per cent of active companies with foreign 
ownership were registered in the Moscow in 1997 (RSC, 1998). 
 
Economic system change has expanded the enterprise sector in the 
FSU. However, in addition to the increase in the number of 
enterprises, the ex-Soviet enterprises need to grow and increase their 
  5effectiveness in order to be able to compensate the output fall caused 
by the economic system change. In order to succeed in the 
transformation, enterprise managers in the ex-Soviet republics ought 
to improve the performance of their company as they are ultimately 
responsible for putting of the economic transformation into practice.  
 
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to review literature how the 
post-Soviet enterprises and their managers have succeeded in 
adjusting to the transformation from the centrally planned system 
towards a market economy, i.e. how the former Soviet companies and 
their directors have managed in transforming their companies to meet 
the requirements of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market instead of the 
‘visible foot’ of the central planning. 
 
Understanding organisational and managerial transformation in the 
former Soviet republics is not only important for policy-makers and 
economists aiming at accelerating the catching up of the former 
USSR, but also for the foreign business community interested in 
doing business with the ex-Soviet companies. Deeper comprehension 
of transition in the former Soviet companies is necessary as it may 
offer valuable information about the advancement of potential 
partners, competitors and investment opportunities in the FSU.  
 
Even if academic interest in organisational and managerial transition 
has increased during the past few years, there is still a multitude of 
unanswered questions puzzling scholars and practitioners. Besides, it 
should be stressed that transition is an extremely vivid phenomenon, 
which constantly introduces new questions.  
 
To support the research on the organisational and managerial 
transformation in the FSU, this article aims at reviewing literature on 
the transformation of the Soviet enterprise and its management. The 
review on Soviet management is necessary, as without knowledge on 
the starting point of the transformation it is impossible to understand 
the current organisational and managerial transition.  
 
  62.  The Soviet Enterprise and Its Management 
 
This section reviews the management of the Soviet enterprises, which 
operated under the central planning. The privately owned producers’ 
co-operatives, which operated outside the central planning, or the 
foreign-owned joint ventures, which were registered in the Soviet 
Union will not be studied. These enterprises were not included 
because the main aim of this research is to study how change from the 
centrally planned system affects the management of enterprises, 
which were directly co-ordinated by the central planning. Neither will 
this section study the impact of the Soviet reforms on the enterprise 
management, and therefore, only a summary of the consequences of 
these reforms to the Soviet enterprise management is presented in the 
following table (see Table 1)
4. 
 
Even if the table above points out dissimilarities between various 
periods, the impact of these reforms on the enterprise management is 
not analysed here since their effect on enterprise management was 
rather cosmetic. Berliner (1988, 277) has characterised the apparent 
managerial transformation by referring to the change between the 
1940’s and the 1980’s with the phrase, “old wine in new bottles”.  
 
The failure of the reforms has been explained in various ways. Firstly, 
bureaucracy stifled reforms and changes took place more at the 
administrative than at the enterprise level (Berliner, 1988). Secondly, 
the reforms did not fulfil the set goals, either (both) because they were 
badly designed and executed or (and) because an economic system 
has a tendency to reject alien parts and thus render all partial reforms 
inefficient (Sutela, 1991). Thirdly, the changes were technical rather 
than fundamental, involving such matters as new success indicators or 
revised planning procedures (Berliner, 1988).  
 
In the mid-1980’s, Perestroika began a transformation process, which 
proved more significant for enterprise management than earlier 
economic reforms during the Soviet era. The impact of Perestroika on 
enterprise management is outlined briefly at the end of this section. 
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the planned economy, it is necessary to discuss whether there were 
major differences within enterprise management or whether the Soviet 
enterprise management can be considered homogeneous. Answering 
this fundamental question requires a comparison drawn between the 
management of the different types of the Soviet enterprise. 
 
First, Soviet enterprises could be compared by dividing them into two 
main categories: the khozraschetnyi and the biudzhetnyi. The former 
were required to follow the system of economic accounting, which 
meant that the income of the enterprises must cover the costs. The 
latter were part of the state budget, which meant that the biudzhetnyi 
enterprises had no direct need of self-profitability (Berliner, 1988).  
 
Although this division would have been important for the 
management of enterprises operating in a market economy, it should 
not be forgotten that the demand of self-profitability for the 
khozraschetnyi was to a large extent theoretical. Soviet enterprises did 
not go bankrupt even when costs would have exceeded their income. 
Although the authorities could dismiss managers if a Soviet enterprise 
became unprofitable, Soviet managers had a fairly firm hold on their 
posts and were dismissed surprisingly rarely (Gregory and Stuart, 
1981; Sutela, 1982). Furthermore, both of these enterprise types were 
ultimately owned by the state and operated under state control, and 
therefore, it can be assumed that the differences in managerial 
behaviour were not marked enough to allow one to talk about 
completely different management cultures between the khozraschetnyi 
and the biudzhetnyi.  
 
Secondly, Soviet enterprises could be compared on the basis of the 
administrative unit to which they were subordinated. Milner et al. 
(1986, 29) divide Soviet enterprises into five groups: (1) enterprises 
of all-union ministries; (2) enterprises of republic ministries; (3) 
enterprises of local subordination; (4) enterprises of union-republic 
subordination; and (5) enterprises of direct subordination of union-
republic ministries of the USSR.  
 
  8It might be presumed that national and regional characteristics would 
have reflected most strongly in the enterprises that operated under the 
control of republican, regional or local authorities rather than in all-
union enterprises, which were more directly subordinated to the 
centrally planned system. However, empirical research data from 
Soviet Estonia indicate rather surprisingly that very few differences 
existed between the centrally supervised and decentralised enterprises 
(Conyngham, 1982). Presumably, such small variation can be 
explained because ultimately all Soviet enterprises operated under the 
centrally planned system. 
 
Although a great number of nationalities existed in the Soviet Union 
in 1989 (White, 1991), empirical studies seem to indicate that national 
differences were reflected faintly in enterprise management. Only six 
per cent of over 100 Estonian managers believed that a manager was 
able to freely display her/his national cultural characteristics in the 
management of a Soviet organisation (Liuhto, 1997a). On the other 
hand, studies point to differences between nationalities in foreign-
owned joint ventures, which did not operate under the central 
planning (Liuhto, 1991).  
 
Previous research findings emphasise the homogenising effect of the 
centrally planned system on enterprise management. Thus, this 
research is based on the assumption that relatively little significant 
variation could be found in the management of Soviet enterprises 
which operated under the central planning. On account of this, 
management of enterprises under the Soviet planning regime is here 
referred to as “Management Sovieticus” (Liuhto, 1993b, 8)
5. In the 
following, the basic characteristics of Management Sovieticus are 
described as it creates the basis for the organisational and managerial 




Instead of studying the theories on organisation and management that 
prevailed in the USSR, this study aims to characterise concrete 
management behaviour of the Soviet enterprises
7. The reason for 
focusing on real enterprise management derives from the fact that the 
management of Soviet enterprises deviated considerably from these 
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1991; Sutela, 1991).  
 
This section aims to approach Management Sovieticus from a 
manager’s perspective. A system description of the planned economy 
was considered less significant in this context because ideal enterprise 
management differed to a great extent from actual enterprise 
management (Berliner, 1988). Therefore, the planning mechanism is 
only described in those parts that were directly reflected in concrete 
Soviet enterprise management.  
 
To begin, Soviet enterprise management was based on state 
ownership and centralisation of economic activities (Sutela, 1984). 
Enterprises in the planned economy formed one economic entity 
within which they were closely integrated to one another’s 
operations
8. The enterprises were closely integrated that free 
competition between state companies was a relatively unknown 
concept in the Soviet Union. Kozminski (1993, 7) emphasises this 
close integration of enterprises by describing all economic operations 
within the planned economy with the term, “one big factory”, and 
correspondingly, Blasi et al. (1997, 27) with the term “one giant 
corporation”. 
 
The ‘board of directors’ of this giant factory was the Communist 
Party, which formulated visions to develop the Soviet society and 
economy. The responsibility of the planning mechanism was to 
implement these visions into practical measures (Milner et al., 1986). 
The planned system also took care of the establishment of enterprises, 
the determination of business ideas and the strategic management of 
enterprises. In this official model, the duties of enterprise managers 
were restricted to the organisation of production (Gramatzki, 1988; 
Kornai, 1992; Mintzberg, 1992).  
 
The planning mechanism made plans for enterprise management
9. 
Enterprise managers were legally obliged to fulfil these goals. At 
most, they were obliged to accomplish as many as 200 different plans. 
At the end of the 1970’s, the number of plans dwindled to ‘only’ 
twenty (Sutela, 1982). Although there were plenty of single goals, 
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1986, 20): 
 
(1)  Production goals were connected to the particular 
demands of society for the organisation’s products 
and services. 
 
 (2)  Economic goals focused on the contribution of the 
organisation to national revenue, the maximum 
productivity of labour, and the optimal use of 
resources. 
 
 (3)  Technological goals were oriented towards the 
introduction of new technologies and production 
equipment, progressive materials and products, and 
advanced scientific ideas. 
 
 (4)    Social goals specified the role of the organisation in 
solving the programme tasks of social progress, and in 
meeting the social needs of working. 
 
A fundamental shortcoming of the centrally planned economy was the 
fact that the state and enterprise management had different goals 
(Richman, 1965). The state aimed at maximising the efficient use of 
resources, whereas the enterprise management aimed at maximising 
its own bonuses
10. The maximisation of bonuses usually led to the 
optimisation of production goals instead of the maximisation of 
production capacity use (Conyngham, 1982).  
 
In practice the optimisation of production goals meant that enterprise 
managers attempted to fulfil the set goal but did not, even if capable, 
exceed it. This optimisation occurred because to exceed a goal would 
have raised the future plan. A raised production goal was a risk factor 
because the enterprise might not be able to fulfil the goal in the future 
and could thus risk its bonus (Sutela, 1982; Berliner, 1988).  
 
An example of how increased efficiency could negatively affect 
enterprise operations is the notorious experiment in the Shchekino 
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quadrupled its labour productivity. The more efficient the operation, 
the higher the goals of the combine were set. Finally, the enterprise 
could no longer maintain the high output level and, as a result, the 
enterprise and its personnel lost their bonuses (Tiusanen, 1987; 
Beissinger, 1988).  
 
This aim of the planning mechanism to raise goals resulted in 
enterprise managers benefiting more from maintaining the 
organisational status quo than from operating their enterprise more 
efficiently. Given the inherent structural problem of the planned 
system, it would have proved irrational to develop innovations within 
this system. Innovative managers took a financial risk as they could 
reserve no exclusive rights for innovations, which were meant for the 
use of all socialist companies (Tiusanen, 1988). The inadequate 
planned system was one of the main reasons for weak innovative 
skills among the organisation’s personnel and low capacity to change 
in the organisation (Berliner, 1988). 
 
Another fundamental deficiency of the planned system was its 
overemphasis on production goals. Berliner describes the emphasised 
role of the production goals as follows (1988, 28) “if the firm could 
fulfil either the profit plan [economic goal] or the output plan 
[production goal] but not both, it ordinarily would choose that 
alternative which provided premia, i.e. fulfilment of the output plan”. 
This overemphasis on quantitative product goals led to a management 
behaviour which was less geared to increase the efficiency of 
company operations.  
 
In addition, plans failed to function as a measure of efficiency largely 
because efficiency was determined by the ‘visible foot’ of the 
planning mechanism, instead of the ‘invisible hand’ of market forces. 
The fact that prices were determined artificially managed to further 
complicate the process of indicating efficiency through plans. 
Besides, money played a passive role in economic activity. Thus 
money was not a factor that either encouraged or inhibited the 
economic activity of Soviet enterprises (Gregory and Stuart, 1981).  
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managers began to deviate from the official model for enterprise 
management and to manipulate the system. The means of 
manipulation were directed to three main areas: (1) the availability of 
production factors; (2) the plans determined by administrative organs; 
and (3) the output of production. 
 
The availability of production factors was manipulated mainly 
because the planned system operated deficiently and the Soviet Union 
faced a chronic shortage of production factors. Enterprise managers 
were forced to resort to non-legal and even illegal measures to ensure 
obtaining their factors of production (Anderle, 1976; Conyngham, 
1982)
11. The four main ways of securing the availability of supplies 
were: (1) increasing enterprise autarky; (2) hoarding production 
factors; (3) personal production network; and (4) use of non-legal 
middlemen (tolkachi).  
 
Enterprise managers aimed to gain control over the entire production 
chain from the production of raw materials to the processing of the 
final products. Enterprise autarky was a measure for minimising the 
risks of dependence on uncertain deliveries from the planning 
mechanism. The greater the emphasis placed on self-sufficiency of the 
enterprise, the more difficult it was for the planning system to gain 
advantage from the specialisation of production (Berliner, 1988)
12. 
 
A less official measure than the autarky policy was to hoard 
production factors. By hoarding production factors unofficially in 
storage, enterprises attempted to avoid the material bottlenecks of the 
planned economy and thus ensure that they could fulfil the given 
goals. Enterprise managers would be able to hoard production factors, 
for instance from the previous five-year plan, if their enterprise had 
not used all of its supplies. In other words, enterprise managers 
secretly stored spare supplies and thus created a perestrakhovka i.e. a 
supply ‘insurance’ for the enterprise (Grancelli, 1988).  
 
As a result of the hoarding of labour, the hidden labour reserves in 
industrial enterprises ranged from 10 to 20 per cent of total personnel 
(Grancelli, 1988). Other sources suggest that a share of ‘surplus 
  13labour’ was substantially larger. Kuznetsov (1994, 964) offers an 
illustrative empirical finding on extensive labour hoarding in the 
ammonium industry; “several producers of ammonia, using the same 
technology and plant, were surveyed in Russia in 1983. According to 
a normative, the production needed manpower of 83. The actual 
employment ranged from the normative figure to as many as 230, 294 
and even 490 in some enterprises”.  
 
In order to attract employees, the Soviet managers did not only 
promise better wages, but also fringe benefits. These benefits could 
include housing, kindergartens, holiday accommodation and deficit 
(shortage) goods for employees (Hanson, 1986; Sutela, 1987). 
Gradually various social tasks accumulated around the actual 
operation of the Soviet enterprise that it began to resemble more a 
feudal system, rather than a business enterprise (Lehtinen, for 
reference see Liuhto, 1991). 
 
For the Soviet economy hoarding proved disadvantageous, as 
consequently enormous amounts of resources were unused and even 
spoilt in storage (Tiusanen, 1987). Secondly, hoarding further added 
to the bottlenecks in the supply of factors of production, which in turn 
weakened the efficiency of the centrally planned economy and forced 
enterprises to hoard even more production factors (Grancelli, 1988). 
Hoarding formed a self-enforcing vicious circle, which led to the 
planned economies being duly characterised as “economies of 
shortages” (Kornai, 1979, 1).  
 
The managers of Soviet enterprises also attempted to solve the supply 
problems of the official planned system through an unofficial 
commodity exchange, that is to say through resorting to their personal 
production networks (Berliner, 1957). This unofficial commodity 
exchange was based more on personal relations and the principle of 
reciprocity than on financial compensation (Millar, 1988).  
 
A fictional example of the personal production network could be a 
situation where the manager of the Red October enterprise has 
rendered a favour to the manager of the Dynamo enterprise. Later, if 
needed, the manager of Red October could ask the manager of 
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this request, (s)he can resort to her/his own personal relation network 
and seek a manager who owes a favour and can fulfil Red October’s 
manager’s wish. 
 
The use of personal relationships in unofficial activities is commonly 
referred to as blat, which “indicates the use of personal influence to 
obtain something one is not entitled to - or conversely, to something 
one is entitled to but that is unobtainable through official channels” 
(Grancelli, 1988, 88). In this context it is necessary to point out that 
the use of unofficial relations should not be interpreted as a sign of the 
immorality of Soviet managers, who might not have resorted to 
managerial non-legalities if the official economic system had 
functioned properly (Berliner, 1988).  
 
Fairly close to this productional blat was the use of tolkachi i.e. non-
legal supply agents. Tolkachi were people who had personal relation 
networks with producers and authorities working in the central 
planning. They used them in supplying production factors from one 
enterprise to another without the knowledge of the official 
mechanism. The enterprise receiving the supply paid for tolkachi’s 
services, often in cash or other financial benefits (Berliner, 1957). The 
main difference between a personal production network and tolkachi 
was that the former was chiefly based on reciprocity whereas the 
services of tolkachi were principally compensated in roubles or in 
hard currency.  
 
In addition to ensuring the availability of factors of production, 
another means to secure the fulfilment of goals was to attempt to 
reduce state plans. Here it is necessary to point out that an enterprise 
was able, even within the official system, to influence the goals 
determined by higher authorities. Enterprise management had, when 
the plans were being defined, a right and an obligation to report its 
own production capacity to the administrative organs (Katila, 1985). 
 
In most cases the enterprise management gave the co-ordinating 
organisation a slightly lower estimation of its production capacity 
than it was in reality. This simply derives from the custom of the 
  15planning mechanism to raise the goals. In other words, while the 
management of the enterprise tended to underestimate its production 
capacity, the planning mechanism tended to overestimate it. This type 
of ‘gambling situation’ was a relatively far-spread practice and cannot 
be regarded as illegal even though it was not in accordance with the 
idealistic model (Sutela, 1982; Linz, 1988). 
 
The planning process turned illegal if enterprise managers aimed, with 
the help of their personal relations, to manipulate plans, that is to say, 
to use administrative blat. If the managers of the enterprise had 
functioning personal relations with the officials involved in the 
planning process, they could attempt to bargain for an artificial 
reduction of their production goals. The managers could offer, for 
instance, financial benefits to the official they knew in a ministry so 
that he could then reduce the enterprise’s goal, or replace it with an 
easier one. Because of these measures, the centrally planned economy 
has from time to time been referred to as ‘bargaining economy’, 
where planning occurred by negotiating (Berliner, 1957).  
 
A third major way of fulfilling the goals by unofficial means was the 
manipulation of production output, either by creative production 
decisions or even actual distortion of production figures. The main 
types of creative production decisions were, for example, the 
reduction of the quality of products, irrational production decisions, 
and a production mix, which contradicted the plans. 
 
The quality of products was frequently reduced by a conscious 
decision, often because the enterprise was in danger of falling behind 
its production goals. The managers of the Soviet enterprise, which 
was lagging behind its goals, were forced to increase the pace of 
production, and hence, reduce the quality of production. The artificial 
reduction of quality with the purpose of fulfilling production goals 
was called sturmovshchina i.e. storming (Grancelli, 1988).  
 
Reduction of quality proved a fairly safe means to fulfil production 
goals, as quality was not as easy to control as quantity (Berliner, 
1957; Kemme, 1989). Besides, the authorities responsible for quality 
control frequently connived at an enterprise which fell short of the 
  16quality standards as long as it thus managed to fulfil the quantitative 
production goals (Melin, 1996).  
 
In addition to sturmovshchina, Soviet  managers made irrational 
decisions concerning production output, so that they could fulfil their 
production goals. To illustrate this, windows, paper or steel, which 
were too thick, or oversized nails might be manufactured when the 
efficiency indicator was the weight of production. When the indicator 
was changed to the quantity in pieces, the enterprise might 
manufacture, for instance, window glass so thin that it was broken 
during transportation (Sutela, 1982). From the perspective of the state, 
the production decisions mentioned above were irrational, but from 
the perspective of an enterprise manager they were rational because 
thus the manager and the enterprise could ensure their bonuses. If the 
manager of a Soviet enterprise had attempted to manufacture useful 
and high quality products, the enterprise would not necessarily have 
been able to fulfil the set goals and thus would have lost its bonus. 
 
In addition to quasi-rational production decisions, Soviet managers 
were under some circumstances forced to manipulate the production 
mix of the enterprise. As an example one can take a fictional Soviet 
enterprise, which had to manufacture products A and B, whose 
estimated production costs were 10 roubles. Their calculated sales 
prices, however, were different: the calculated sales price for product 
A was 12 and for B 15 roubles. The plan required the enterprise to 
produce 1,000 units of both product A and B, when a total output 
value would have been 27,000 roubles and total production costs 
20,000 roubles. 
  
Due to practical problems, the real costs rose to 10.2 roubles so that 
the enterprise management could not meet the cost plan. However the 
enterprise could meet the total cost target and the total value of output 
target by manipulating the production mix. Therefore, the enterprise 
produces 180 units less of A, and 180 units more of B. By this 
managerial manoeuvre, the value of output exceeds the production 
costs by slightly more than 7,000 roubles, and the enterprise receives 
its bonus. The consequence of changing the production mix on 
enterprise level was that overproduction of certain commodities and 
  17shortage of others existed simultaneously in the Soviet Union 
(Berliner, 1957). 
 
If the enterprise failed to fulfil the goals by the unofficial means 
described above, the last means was the falsification of production 
figures. Falsification could occur, for instance, when the enterprise 
reported a higher number of its semifinished products than the number 
existing in reality. The basic motive behind the falsification of 
production figures was to ‘buy extra time’ so that the production goals 
could be fulfilled. In other words, the enterprise management intended 
to mend the falsified production figures in the near future so that the 
managers would not be caught in illegal manipulation of the accounts 
(Berliner, 1957).  
 
In addition to this illegal manipulation of accounts, literature also 
provides examples of managerial illegalities which did not aim at the 
attainment of the goals, but merely to an improvement in 
management’s own well-being (Grossman, 1976; Katsenelinboigen, 
1977). An example of this kind of managerial misuse was uncovered 
in Soviet Georgia. The managers of this particular enterprise hid raw 
materials from the state, transferred legally employed people to work 
in an illicit enterprise and finally sold the products on the black 
market (Grancelli, 1988).  
 
The leaders of the Soviet Union were not unaware of the dangers of 
misuse in enterprise management and for that reason built endogenous 
and exogenous control systems to monitor enterprise managers. Their 
activities were supervised, for example through the self-control of 
managers, by the ministries, party and trade unions
13. 
 
In the background of managers’ self-control was the principle of 
ideological maturity which was believed to make managers fulfil the 
set goals more obediently (Anderle, 1976). This principle functioned 
so that managers sought to become members of the Communist Party, 
i.e. ‘enlisted’ themselves in a kind of nomenklatura, which was 
frequently the basis for managerial appointments (Gregory and Stuart, 
1981). In practice party membership turned out to be more of an 
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(Conyngham, 1982).  
 
In addition to managers’ self-control, ministries supervised 
enterprises. Although the Soviet planned economy is usually 
considered a tightly controlled system, ministries were prepared to 
connive at small misuse as long as the enterprise was thus able to 
fulfil its goals (Millar, 1988). The reason for this practice was simply 
that strict control over enterprises might have led to the failure of both 
the enterprises and thus the co-ordinating ministry to attain their 
goals. Similarly, it was beneficial for the party secretary working 
within the enterprise to create a positive image of the enterprise for 
higher party organs since her/his position was also evaluated in terms 
of the enterprise’s ‘administrative’ efficiency (Berliner, 1957). 
 
Trade unions exercised less real control over the Soviet enterprise 
management than ministries and party secretaries. The reason for this 
was that enterprise management could fairly easily replace the trade 
union representative of the enterprise (Berliner, 1957). Similarly, the 
trade union meetings were an apparent attempt to influence enterprise 
management (Grancelli, 1988).  
 
To sum up the control of the Soviet enterprise, it can be stated that the 
structural problem inherent in the control system was that the 
supervising organs and enterprise management shared the same 
objective - to fulfil the production goals. This common goal led to the 
situation where unofficial management behaviour became widely 
accepted and used in the Soviet Union.  
 
In this context, it is necessary to stress that the control system was not 
always aware of unofficial activities in the enterprise. Enterprise 
managers could fairly effectively cover their illegal activities through 
Cupertino within the enterprise (krugovaya poruka). The director of 
the enterprise tried to create a close loyalty network between the key 
persons of the enterprise, which included the general director, the 
chief engineer and the chief accountant. The chief engineer was 
important as (s)he was responsible for production in the Soviet 
enterprise, and the chief accountant as (s)he was responsible for the 
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management troika (trio) usually succeeded in hiding the unofficial 
side of Management Sovieticus (Grancelli, 1988)
14.  
 
It needs to be pointed out that the general director of the enterprise 
was capable of effectively pressing these key persons to cover up non-
legal management practices. For instance, (s)he could resort to certain 
managerial sanctions or withhold bonuses if the other key persons 
were not willing to co-operate. Similarly, leaving the krugovaya 
poruka was difficult because enterprise managers could threaten to 
reveal previous misuse in which these key persons were involved. 
Through the krugovaya poruka key persons and their activities had to 
be closely controlled as the breaking of the troika could endanger the 
future of the whole top-management team (Berliner, 1988; Grancelli, 
1988). 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that unofficial managerial methods 
grew to be a part of the official management culture of the Soviet 
enterprise. Therefore, the description of Management Sovieticus 
should not exclude the unofficial side to management. Figure 1 sums 
up both faces of Soviet enterprise management - the unofficial and 
official side.  
 
The left-hand side of the figure describes the official (or idealistic) 
management of the Soviet enterprise. The right-hand side summarises 
the unofficial (or realistic) management of the Soviet enterprise. The 
unofficial side of Management Sovieticus is shaded because it was 
not, despite its scale, in accordance with the official rules. 
 
The top of the figure contains the party and the planning mechanism, 
which functioned, in the idealistic model, as the strategic leading body 
of one giant corporation. Due to the increased bureaucracy of the 
Soviet economy, the party and the planning mechanism handled their 
tasks routinely rather than according to the principles of strategic 
management (Tiusanen, 1980). Strategic management was only 
emphasised when the Soviet Union attempted economic reforms 
(Berliner, 1988).  
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enterprise was responsible for the organisation of production within 
the enterprise, as the task of the official system was to supply the 
enterprise with the factors of production which were determined by 
the plans (Katila, 1985). In the official model Soviet managers could 
justifiably be referred to as plant managers (Melin, 1996). As a result 
of the imperfect operation of the planning mechanism, the centrally 
planned economy became a shortage economy thus managers of 
Soviet enterprises were obliged to divert attention from internal 
production management to externally-shaped survival management 
(Storm, 1991). In fact, the shortcomings of the planning mechanism 
expanded the Soviet manager’s field of duties from production 
management towards enterprise management in market economies. 
 
The fundamental idea behind the official model was that plans were to 
optimise the use of resources and hence to maximise the production 
output of enterprises (Kantrovich, 1972; Veinshtein, 1972). The 
deficiencies of the planned economy led, however, to enterprise 
managers using means bordering between legal and illegal, 
manipulating the availability of production factors, state plans and 
production output (Berliner, 1988).  
 
Unofficial measures reduced the quality of produced goods and the 
quantity of production, which further added to the shortage of 
production factors. One means of fighting the material bottlenecks 
was to increase production autarky. As a consequence, however, 
Soviet managers could no longer attain the objective of the idealistic 
model - specialisation (Berliner, 1988).  
 
Socialist ideology emphasised the ideological maturity of the 
manager, who was then believed to be loyal to the aims of Soviet 
society. The embodiment of ideological maturity was membership of 
the Communist Party (Anderle, 1976; Conyngham, 1982). The 
importance of the Communist Party membership for enterprise 
management can be illustrated in the fact that only few general 
directors of significant industrial corporations were not party 
members (Gregory and Stuart, 1981). However, even party 
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and managerial misuse was not unusual.  
 
The principles of socialist ideology also entailed that, firstly, 
enterprise personnel would participate in the managing the enterprise 
and, secondly, that all employees would be equal. In practice, 
however, Soviet enterprises had adopted the one manager principle as 
early as during Stalin’s era (Kiezun, 1991). The position of the Soviet 
manager within the enterprise proved much stronger and more 
powerful than the idealistic model would suggest. Granick (1960, 
161-162) has aptly described the strong position of the manager: 
“despite all the formal centralisation, the individual plant director in 
Russia [the Soviet Union] seems to be much more successful in 
building his own little empire than his counterpart in the American 
giant corporation”.  
 
Managers were able to gain power within the enterprise rapidly, as 
neither the external nor the internal control system interfered in the 
centralisation of power and activities of the enterprise managers as 
long as the enterprise was fulfilling its plans and its managers were 
not caught in conducting managerial illegalities (Berliner, 1957). 
Although Soviet managers had considerable power within the 
enterprise (Arakelian, 1950), they tried, within their capabilities, to 
minimise risks. Risk avoidance could be seen, for example, in 
decision-making, which was to a large extent based on transforming 
orders from higher authorities into written orders for subordinates 
(Lawrence and Vlachoutsicos, 1990)
15.  
 
The managers of the Soviet enterprise became a managerial élite, 
which included the general director, the chief accountant and the chief 
engineer. In addition, the party secretary operating within the 
enterprise had influence to the enterprise management (Melin, 1996). 
As management in most cases did not follow the official regulations, 
the general director, along with other key persons, tended to withhold 
information both from the employees and co-ordinating organisations 
(Krips, 1992; Kozminski, 1993). The position of employees was in 
reality far from equal in the Soviet enterprise.  
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incomprehensible when approached from the enterprise manager’s 
perspective operating in a market economy. Western managers 
operating in a different economic system are not always fully aware 
of the logic behind the following five core pillars of the Management 
Sovieticus: (1) quasi-rational management; (2) overemphasised status 
quo management; (3) system immobility created survival 
management; (4) nomenklatura management; and (5) extensive 
bureaucratisation of management. As the main content of these 
aspects was elaborated already earlier in this section, they are 
described in this context only shortly.  
 
Firstly, inappropriate performance criteria and their deficient control 
created many managerial decisions which were irrational at the 
system level but rational at the management level as they ensured the 
fulfilment of the plan, and hence the achievement of the bonus. The 
irreconcilable conflict between the system’s goals and managerial 
behaviour led to quasi-rational management i.e. to managerial 
decisions which fulfilled the external appearance but not the core of 
the plan. The overemphasis on the superficial plan fulfilment caused 
many absurd managerial decisions when approached from the 
perspective of a manager operating in a market economy. For 
example, a Soviet transportation company did not use the shortest or 
the fastest route to convey the goods from the factory to the final 
destination when the performance was evaluated on the basis of 
transported kilometres or hours. Due to inappropriate performance 
criteria, a company did not aim at minimising the transported journey 
or time, but on the contrary, maximising them. Correspondingly, due 
to deficient control a Soviet factory produced goods, which could not 
always be used for their original purpose. 
 
Secondly, the overemphasised status quo management derives from 
the fact that the Soviet management did not aim at exceeding the 
production plan (quantity of production) or the production standards 
(quality of production) even if the enterprise would have been capable 
in producing more and better goods. This status quo policy in 
management was logical risk aversion practice, as exceeding 
production plan would have raised the production goal of the next 
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have jeopardised the achievement of the production goal without any 
substantial compensation for producing better commodities. Although 
status quo management may seem irrational from a Western 
manager’s point of view, it can be considered rational when 
approached from the Soviet manager’s perspective.  
 
Thirdly, even if the system immobility created survival management 
may sound rather a controversial concept it needs to be stressed that 
the immobility at system level caused turbulence at the management 
level. In other words, deficient operation and chronic shortages of the 
planned system forced the Soviet management to practise unofficial 
managerial measures to fulfil the gaps of the system. For example, 
quite many Soviet enterprises hoarded raw materials and labour 
despite the fact that there was no immediate need for obtaining these 
resources. These resources remained often unused for several years 
and were sometimes even spoiled in the warehouse. Furthermore, the 
Soviet management was sometimes forced to use non-legal 
management practices to be capable to fulfil the plan.  
 
Fourthly,  nomenklatura management signifies the ideologisation of 
managerial work. For example, the Soviet managers were appointed 
to the most prestigious management posts not only on the basis of 
their managerial qualities but rather on the basis of the (external) 
ideological maturity of the manager. This nomenklatura policy 
obviously slowed down the mobility and the accumulation of the 
managerial know-how in the Soviet enterprises. Even if the 
ideologisation of the Management Sovieticus was to some extent only 
an official play, a few of ideological aspects reflected in actual 
management behaviour. The role of the party representative in the 
management and the numerous social obligations of the Soviet 
factories are just examples of the overall ideologisation of the Soviet 
enterprise management. The activities of the Soviet enterprises were 
influenced by the multitude of ideological, political, and social 
rationales of the state not by the commercial motives of the enterprise 
managers and owners like it is the case in the majority of the 
companies operating in market economies. 
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clearly separates the Management Sovieticus from ‘the market 
economy management’. It can be stated that the enterprise 
management in a market economy operates within the framework 
created by laws, but in the Soviet Union the managers operated as a 
part of the web designed by ‘the bureaucrats’. In other words, in a 
market economy enterprises can operate freely within certain 
legislative frame but in the Soviet system the enterprises fulfilled a 
specified task in a giant production network. Even the largest Soviet 
companies became non-independent departments, which obeyed ‘the 
visible foot’ of the Soviet bureaucracy. The extensive 
bureaucratisation of the Soviet management meant that the state 
machinery was not an external guide but an internal controller of 
managerial activities. 
 
To conclude, Management Sovieticus was much more 
multidimensional than what can be assumed on the basis of the 
official descriptions. According to the official model, the position of 
the Soviet manager mainly corresponded to that of the plant director 
who was responsible for the internal production processes of the 
factory. In the unofficial model the Soviet manager’s field of duties 
expands from internal production management to struggling against 
the shortages of the planned economy, or coping with the bottlenecks 
of the external management environment. Unofficial management 
bears more resemblance to enterprise management in a market 
economy than management defined in the official model. However, in 
this context, it needs to be remembered that unofficial management 
likewise excluded four sub-areas of market economy management: 
legal entrepreneurship, strategy, innovation, and leading change 
(Kozminski, 1993).  
 
These characteristics began to be emphasised during the second half 
of the 1980’s, when enterprises operating under the planned system 
were gradually given more independence. One notable feature in 
increasing independence was the replacement of state plans with state 
orders (Beissinger, 1988; Kuznetsov, 1994). Enterprises had a right to 
sell the surplus of state orders directly to other enterprises or 
consumers (Burawoy and Hendley, 1992).  
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The reforms carried out in the mid-1980’s did not only increase the 
opportunities of the organisations that had operated within the 
planned system, but also abolished state monopoly in 
entrepreneurship. In the latter part of the 1980’s, it was legal to 
establish enterprises, which operated outside the central planning. 
These types of enterprises included producers’ co-operatives, which 
were owned by private Soviet citizens, and foreign-owned joint 
ventures. In addition, enterprise managers and employees had a right 
to lease the assets of state enterprises and thus practise legal 




Even if the legislative development of the mid-1980’s laid the seeds 
for entrepreneurship, the real opportunities did not emerge until the 
1990’s when the structures of the centrally planned economy finally 
disappeared (Hisrich and Gratchev, 1995). Although the first steps of 
the organisational and managerial transformation in the Soviet era 
were not long, they were extremely important for the organisational 
and managerial transition since these steps started the diversification 
of fairly homogeneous Management Sovieticus. The heterogenisation 
of enterprise management should not be overlooked when studying 
the organisational and managerial transformation from the centrally 
planned system, as new forms of operation start from different bases 
in transformation than those companies which have operated under 
the central planning.  
 
3. Research on the Organisational and Managerial 
Transformation in the former Soviet Union Reviewed 
 
This section reviews research on the transformation in post-Soviet 
enterprises and their management
17. The review indicates firstly that 
the emphasis on Russia among the former Soviet republics can clearly 
be noticed. Special interest towards Russia is understandable, as she is 
the biggest former Soviet republic with 150 million inhabitants and 
has vast natural resources. These factors, among others, have enticed 
many foreign companies to Russia.  
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attracted Western academics, both directly (more extensive research 
funding) and indirectly (wider circle of readers) to study the 
transformation in Russia. Secondly, the review shows that many 
researches deal with ownership changes (mainly privatisation) and 
restructuring, which are often explicitly or implicitly linked with the 
analysis of enterprise performance. However, the research results on 
the relationship between the ownership and performance are by no 
means unambiguous.  
 
Some studies indicate that private ownership in the post-communist 
economies influences positively the transformation in enterprise 
management (EBRD, 1997; Frydman et al., 1998). For example, 
Frydman et al. (1998, 2) argue that “private ownership dramatically 
improves corporate performance, and that its impact is the strongest 
enhancing a firm’s ability to generate revenues”. This view indicates 
the importance of the ownership shift from the state to private owners 
in accelerating organisational performance. 
 
On the other hand, some scholars suggest that the empirical results on 
the relationship between privatisation and performance are not clear 
(Akimova and Schwödiauer, 1998). Moreover, some academics argue 
that privatisation may not necessarily lead to considerable 
improvement of performance (Jones, 1998, Jones and Mygind, 1998; 
Liuhto, 1999c). Romanov (1996, 233) takes even more critical 
standpoint on the results of privatisation when stating that “the 
Russian government is obviously disappointed that privatisation of 
enterprises has not brought fast positive shifts in management and in 
the growth of efficiency. The possession of shares has not brought 
radical changes in the behaviour of the new owners of industry - the 
existing managers (actual owners) or the workers (the nominal 
owners)”. It has also been concluded that the consequences of the 
privatisation in post-socialist company are not comparable with the 
experiences of privatisation in a market economy (Zilcken, 1995). 
 
Shama (1993) compares the basic characteristics of management 
between privately and state-owned companies. Shama’s observations 
seem to show that management of state-owned companies shares 
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management of privately-owned companies is closer to market 
oriented management. Shama’s views are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Although Shama’s comparison points to marked differences between 
private and state-owned companies, its indifference to managerial 
differences within the private or state sector make it slightly 
exaggerating. In this context, it should first be reminded that pressure 
for change in state-owned companies can differ. Even though the 
majority of managers in these non-private companies have witnessed 
the disappearance of the state’s soft budget constraint, some state-
owned enterprises (for example, in Russian heavy or defence 
industry) have managed to maintain their special status in state 
funding (Yergin and Gustafson, 1995). The companies with a special 
status have presumably experienced less pressure for managerial 
transformation than the state companies operating on the principle of 
self-profitability. 
 
Secondly, it needs to stressed that there exists also diversity among 
privately owned companies. For example, the management of 
enterprises privatised by employee buy-out may differ from the 
private companies with a more clearly focused ownership. 
Management of collectively owned companies is special because of 
unstable ownership arrangements. For example, “ … managers may 
threaten to dismiss those employees who sell their shares to 
outsiders” (Kalmi, 1997, 35), and therefore, acting managers of 
employee-owned enterprises can become less focused on the main 
business as they may try to secure own position within the company. 
Besides, the ownership battles have even led to brutal crimes, such as 
assassinations of managers (Kabalina et al. 1996).  
 
Moreover, one of the problems that collectively owned companies 
face in their management is that employees may aim to maximise 
their own benefits in the short run rather than act in a manner which 
maximises the longer-term shareholder value. According to 
Filatotchev et al. (1996, 91), “compared to conventional 
shareholders, employee-owners who are unable to freely sell their 
shares may prefer the firm to make decision that benefit them in the 
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higher wages, the maintenance of employment, and corresponding 
lower levels of investment). With virtually all their human and 
financial capital tied up in one enterprise, employee shareholders 
may seek to reduce risks by voting for excessive product 
diversification by the firm”.  
 
Taking into consideration managerial turbulence in employee-owned 
companies, it does not come as surprise that employee-owned 
companies have experienced problems in improving their 
performance. Difficulties of employee-owned companies should be 
considered when conclusions about a linkage between private 




In the light of the empirical results presented above, it can be 
concluded that private ownership is not a factor, which leads 
automatically to performance improvement, at least not at early stages 
of the transition. This is not to say that the private ownership would 
not be a more efficient ownership arrangement than the non-private in 
the long-term. Even if the private ownership will most probably turn 
out to be more effective ownership arrangement than non-private 
ownership in stabilised market environments, there are still some 
obstacles in turbulent transition conditions, which may deteriorate the 
effectiveness of private ownership, and hence, these transition-
specific factors should be taken into consideration before the sign of 
equality is put between private ownership and organisational success.  
 
In addition to the superiority of private ownership, some studies stress 
the importance of foreign investments and foreign ownership in the 
organisational transformation.  According to the EBRD (1998, 82), 
“FDI contributes to the transition and economic performance across 
the region [the former socialist countries] in three major ways. First, 
FDI may directly increase capital accumulation. Second, it raises the 
productivity of the enterprise sector and benefits export performance. 
Third, it generates technological and organisational benefits for 
domestic suppliers and competitors”.  
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fundamental engine of social change in the Soviet Union”. Similarly, 
Purju (1998) has suggested the significance of foreign ownership as it 
leads to a better financial position and easier penetration to foreign 
markets. 
 
Despite the possible correlation between a high FDI inflow and 
progress in transition, the following question may arise; does a high 
FDI inflow cause the positive transition, or vice versa, is progress in 
transition the main reason for growing FDI inflow. Moreover, in 
assessing the role of the FDI inflow, the significance of the FDI 
should be analysed vis-à-vis the total investment accumulation. For 
example in Russia, the FDIs formed only three per cent of the gross 
investments in 1995 whereas in smaller former Soviet republics this 
share can be much higher (Rautava, 1996; Kivikari, 1998).  
 
Furthermore, it can be asked whether foreign investment is the 
ultimate factor behind the positive transformation or whether the main 
determinant is the increased investment capital regardless of the 
country of origin. In this context, it should be reminded that it is 
estimated that a substantial share of the FDIs, for instance, in the 
Russian Federation is Russian by origin, although they might have ‘a 
foreign flag’ on them
19. In other words, some Russian capitalists have 
first moved the financial capital outside Russia, and thereafter, they 
have started to ‘repatriate’ the capital in Russia. In many cases, such 
capital movements have been a precautionary measure to protect 
investments in Russia with the foreign status. On the other hand, in 
some cases money laundry and tax evasions have been the ultimate 
motive behind these capital transfers (Liuhto, 1998a). 
 
In addition to the questions presented above, research findings point 
out how foreign influence is not a pre-condition for successful 
organisational transition. For example, Akimova and Schwödiauer 
(1998, 20) state that “[organisational]  restructuring can start 
successfully even in the absence of foreign investment”. Moreover, 
scholars suggest that foreign practices are not always effective in the 
FSU, and therefore, foreign practices should be adapted to the local 
circumstances before their use (Nurmi and Üksvarav, 1993; Holt et 
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“ … any universalist assumption concerning direct transferability of 
Western values, management techniques, or organizational 
expectations is erroneous. … The Russians do not want to feel 
subordinated to a system adapted from Western practices; they want 
to create a new economic and social system unique to their culture. 
They recognize the value of adopting principles and practices that are 
proven effective, but do not want to unconditionally accept any model 
that we [Westerners] might propose”.  
 
It seems that the post-Soviet managers are trying to copy effectiveness 
not the management culture per se from the Western firms. Although 
Western management practices have proven to be effective in a 
market economy, it does not mean that Western practices would be 
directly transferable to transition conditions since direct adaptation 
most probably diminish the efficiency of the Western management 
practices. Therefore, the adaptation of the suitable Western practices 
and their integration with the local business culture are probably the 
key words for the positive performance, not the copying of the 
Western management culture as a whole. In other words, the question 
is more which Western methods can be imported and which local 
practices should be adopted than whether either Western management 
methods or local practices alone are the best solution in a transition 
economy. 
 
Arenkov and Rakhmatullina (1999, 17) aptly describe the need for the 
optimal balance between Western and Eastern practices as follows: 
“They [international companies operating in Russia] have to find a 
balance between standardization and adaptation to local market 
conditions. Being global these companies generally use standardized 
approach in their product and communication strategies. Adaptation 
to local condition takes place mostly in packaging and advertising 
texts, slogans and in some cases trade mark names according to 
cultural and legal requirements”. 
 
The fact that the post-Soviet managers do not want to adapt all 
Western influences is not perhaps the best indication that Western 
management practices are not directly transferable to the FSU but the 
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behaviour (Shekshnia and Puffer, 1996; Suutari, 1998). According to 
a Finnish manager who operated in Russia, “the management models 
that I have learned did not apply in Russia, and thus I had to start to 
learn a totally new basis for my thinking” (Suutari, 1996, 262-263). 
Foreign managers are sometimes forced to adopt features that are at 
least partially influenced by less advanced methods of the 
Management Sovieticus. As an example, authoritarian management 
style and the use of written instructions and direct orders can be 
mentioned (Suutari, 1996).  
 
A rather good indicator that foreign ownership does not guarantee 
organisational success is a large number of inactive foreign 
companies. For example in Russia, only some 15,000 companies with 
foreign ownership were active of approximately 45,000 registered 
foreign companies in the beginning of the 1999 (Liuhto, 1997b; RSC, 
1999). As some two-thirds of foreign companies do not operate on 
permanent basis, it might be appropriate to reconsider before the sign 
of equality is put between foreign ownership and organisational 
success. It is perhaps too early to draw definite conclusions on a 
strong linkage between foreign ownership and rapid organisational 
transition before reasons for such widely spread inactivity among 
foreign companies are analysed thoroughly. 
 
To conclude the discussion about the impact of the foreign 
investments and foreign ownership on the organisational and 
managerial transition, the role of the foreign companies and 
investment become visible rather easily especially in small transition 
economies, whereas in large transition countries the foreign 
companies can be regarded more as a lubricant than engine of the 
transformation. 
 
These diverse views concerning a relationship between the ownership 
and the organisational and managerial transition stress the importance 
to search for alternative explanations for successful transformation 
elsewhere than ownership arrangements. One alternative path is to 
analyse the responses of the post-Soviet companies to changes in the 
external management environment.  
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Shama (1993, 22) describes the fundamental shift in external 
management environment and its influence on the enterprise 
management as follows; “Imagine, if you will, managers, executives 
and CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] working in a stable, predictable, 
and centrally planned environment, where managerial functions such 
as production, pricing, exporting, planning, distribution, R&D 
[research and development], and personnel management are 
performed in a simple, almost mechanist manner for more than forty 
years. Imagine, then, how bewildered these managers would become 
when, almost overnight, the static and predictable environment with 
which they have become so familiar and comfortable undergoes a 
total and drastic change”. 
 
Due to the revolutionary change in the external business environment, 
it is natural that reactive behaviour dominate in the enterprise 
management (Shama, 1994a). Although proactive management 
behaviour seems to be linked with business environmental 
stabilisation, it does not imply that proactive behaviour would be 
unsuitable for turbulent environment. In fact, the situation is the 
opposite. Should the post-Soviet managers be capable to design 
sustainable strategies in such unstable conditions, this might offer a 
key to success in the long run. Unfortunately, many post-Soviet 
managers are too busy with extinguishing small fires that they do not 
necessarily recognise the main balefire (Liuhto, 1999a).  
 
The evaluation of the EBRD (1998) on the external management 
environment suggests that the Baltic States have progressed fastest 
and correspondingly Turkmenistan and Belarus slowest among the 
former Soviet republics. Russia ranked the 7
th among the 15 ex-Soviet 
republics. Russian enterprise managers considered that a high 
taxation, a lack of financial sources and difficulties in collecting 
payments are the most severe problems in the Russian business 
environment. The general directors of the Russian companies do not 
believe economic miracles but expect incremental improvement to 
happen in the business environment by the end of the millennium 
(Liuhto, 1998a).  
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the external management environment in all former Soviet republics 
have not been conducted yet, it can only be guessed what the main 
differences are. However, it seems that former Soviet republics with 
five million citizens or less have progressed faster than larger ones. 
There are two exceptions to this ‘rule’: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Kazakhstan is an example of a large ex-Soviet republic, which has 
managed to improve its business environment fast, and 
correspondingly, Turkmenistan is an example of a small former 
Soviet republic, which has had serious difficulties in developing her 
business environment (EBRD, 1998).  
 
Although comparative empirical studies on the transformation of the 
external management environment are missing, it can be assumed that 
it is easier to build a comfortable playground for a small enterprise 
population than to build a sufficient field for a large enterprise 
population. Due to obvious difficulties involved in massive building 
projects, the regionalism within large transition countries could open a 
path to obtain advantages of both economies of scale and economies 
of dynamics (Liuhto, 1999d). 
 
As strategic adaptation to changed business environment is the key 
word for positive organisational transition, a closer look on strategies 
of the post-Soviet enterprises is necessary. Hirvensalo (1996, 54-56) 
divides Russian companies on the basis of the activity of their strategy 
and need to change, into five main categories: (1) strategic 
restructurers and restructurers looking for outside help; (2) traders; (3) 
lobbyists; (4) asset strippers and down-sizers; and (5) footdraggers. 
 
Strategic restructurers recognise the need to change and work actively 
to produce that change either entirely on their own or trying to 
identify outside investors who could provide the needed funding. 
Traders recognise the need to change, but they are mostly short-term 
oriented and opportunistic. Lobbyists do not recognise a significant 
need to change, because they believe in survival by lobbying for soft 
budget constraints. Lobbyists’ strategies aim at defending the status 
quo in the short or medium-term. Assets strippers and footdraggers 
see no need to change, because they believe that the government will 
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become active lobbyists or passive footdraggers depending on the 
development of their connections to other actors. 
 
Although the characterisation above indicates that some Russian 
companies can be regarded as strategic restructures, many studies 
reveal that strategic management thinking especially in the early 
phase of the transformation was deficient. For example, a person in a 
Russian company stated about the strategic thinking of the general 
director of that company: “It was just a stream of consciousness, 
talking about everything. I think he used the audience to try out 
various versions of our future operations. At the same time he had no 
clear-cut strategy” (Sterlin, 1991, 16). Also other case studies show 
that strategies were not carefully designed. For instance, a manager of 
an automobile factory expressed that “in general, we are always 
looking for niches where heavy investment is not required. This is our 
strategy” (Naumov, 1991, 11).  
 
Although strategic thinking has obviously improved since the first 
years of the transformation, the improvement has been relatively 
slow. Hisrich and Gratchev (1999, 13) indicate that strategic thinking 
has not improved substantially after almost 10 years of transformation 
when stating that “the future vision of [Russian] business leaders is 
limited, even in the fast growing modern industries such as 
telecommunications and financial services. Very few companies apply 
strategic management techniques using internationally recognized 
instruments”. 
 
As the improvement of strategic thinking is a pre-condition for 
successful business in the long run, the importance of management 
education and training becomes emphasised (Puffer, 1993; Kozlova 
and Puffer, 1994; Greer 1995; Hisrich and Gratchev, 1995; Zhuplev 
and Kozhakhmetov, 1997). Hisrich and Gratchev (1995, 8) stress the 
role of Western methods in upgrading post-Soviet managers’ skills by 
arguing that “all business schools [in Russia] should have a Western-
based curriculum and teach Western business techniques and 
entrepreneurship”.  
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training methods in market economies, the effectiveness of the 
Western management knowledge in the FSU has been questioned. For 
instance, Holt et al. (1994, 136) conclude that “we cannot, for 
example, merely teach (or preach) a doctrine of free enterprise 
development. … What our Russian colleagues want … is a way of 
establishing a pattern of successful examples. This is the essence of 
learning operant conditioning in which sensory evidence can be 
obtained, analyzed, and verified, providing experience and a realistic 
model for adaptation by other organizations”. 
 
These two views presented above show that scholars do not share 
opinions about the applicability of Western methods into the post-
Soviet Union. As a fierce dispute between the managerial 
universalism and localism does not contribute too much on successful 
organisational and managerial transition, it might be worth evaluating 
the priority of managerial skills needed in various transformation 
stages instead.  
 
Tesar (1993) divides management training needs in transition 
economies into immediate, intermediate and long-term needs. As 
immediate needs, decision-making, negotiation and communication 
skills are mentioned. Intermediate needs focus on the main activities 
of the company, such as personnel, financial, production and 
marketing management. Long-term needs mainly concern top 
managers, executive development programmes, corporate 
management and strategic planning.  
 
Tesar’s division of training needs indicates that upgrading operative 
management skills is the first priority in the short-term, whereas the 
strategic spheres of the management become emphasised in the longer 
run. Although the division is understandable, it should not be 
forgotten that even the most skilful managers can become ‘inefficient’ 
if the company is drifting without a predetermined strategic goal and 
vision. 
 
In addition to acquiring new knowledge, scholars have stressed the 
importance of de-memorising of old unsuitable knowledge (Rebernik, 
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memorising of dark sides of the Management Sovieticus by 
employing such managers who do not carry the burden of Soviet 
management, that is to say managers who did not operate in 
management posts in companies under the centrally planned 
economy. This rather paradoxical practice reveals that some Western 
companies believe teaching new managerial methods to inexperienced 
people may be a more effective personnel policy than changing the 
managerial style of an experienced Soviet manager
20. 
 
Recruiting persons without previous experience on the field leads 
indirectly to discussion about the impact of managers’ age on 
organisational performance. Krips (1992, 143-144) argue that “senior 
leaders [age 40-60] are often able to lead effectively but do not want 
to, whereas young leaders [age 25-35] are both unable and unwilling 
to lead efficiently”. Although Krips implicitly suggests that managers’ 
age is not linked to better organisational performance, other scholars 
argue that a relationship between younger age and positive 
organisational performance exists (Richey et al., 1988; Liuhto, 
1999c). For example, Richey et al. (1998, 26-27) indicate that “… 
younger companies and younger directors may find it easier to deal 
with the difficulties in the transition. This may be due to the lesser 
intensity of socialization of the younger managers … and the agility of 
company entities that were established under ‘new rules’ “. 
 
Although the views on the impact of manager’s age on organisational 
performance are not unambiguous, it is rather commonly agreed that 
the changing of ineffective Soviet methods and unethical practices has 
a positive effect to the transformation. Due to the negative impact of 
dark sides of the Management Sovieticus on the transition, research 
on business ethics in transition economies has received increasing 
attention.  
 
According to Puffer and McCarthy (1995), there are several aspects 
found in the business ethics that the Russians regard unethical and the 
Americans ethical, and vice versa. Puffer and McCarthy argue that 
Russian business ethics would hold profit maximisation, 
whistleblowing, exorbitant salary differentials and layoffs unethical, 
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Respectively, a contrary situation would be the personal favouritism 
(blat), grease payments, price fixing, manipulating data and ignoring 
senseless laws and regulations.  
 
Puffer and McCarthy (1995, 41-42) summarises the importance of the 
context-specific factors in evaluating the Russian business ethics as 
follows: “as so often occurred under Communism, managers are 
virtually forced to disregard senseless and contradictory laws, 
including those that discourage reasonable business decisions in a 
competitive market economy. The political and economic 
environments have created a survival mentality in which strictly 
construed ethical behavior can hardly be expected. The extreme 
uncertainty and hardship have led to the wide-spread practice of 
situational ethics wherein inconsistent behavior and variable ethical 
standards are common. The ethical approach of managers might well 
be described as utilitarian, with the end seen as justifying the means”.  
 
Unethical business practices among the post-Soviet managers are not 
necessarily due to completely eroded moral standards in the FSU. 
Unethical business practices can often be explained by the burden of 
the Management Sovieticus, chaotic business environment, deficient 
legislative framework and deteriorated control.  
 
Even if the de-memorising of dark sides of Management Sovieticus is 
well grounded, it must be remembered that backward managerial 
methods dating from the Soviet era cannot be transformed overnight, 
though top managers would be fully aware that the use of old methods 
would slow down organisational and managerial transformation. In 
other words, top managers cannot progress at their own speed but they 
have to adapt their managerial methods to the business environment 
and the employees of the enterprise. This is simply due to the fact that 
there cannot exist a gap between the enterprise management and its 
external and internal environment, as such a gap would lead 
automatically to deteriorating organisational performance. In this 
respect, it needs to be stressed that the core objective of the 
organisational and managerial transformation is not change per se but 
the improvement of enterprises effectiveness (Liuhto, 1998b; 1999b). 
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Although former Soviet managers are occasionally forced to maintain 
some of managerial methods dating from the Soviet era, Management 
Sovieticus is not always maintained by conscious choice. Research 
findings indicate that managers do not always notice how managerial 
methods of the Soviet era may sometimes be unsuitable in changed 
business environment. In other words, Soviet organisation culture has 
become a barrier to change (Kuznetsov, 1994). 
 
An illustration of the existence of Management Sovieticus in 
contemporary management culture is the social responsibilities that 
some state or even privatised companies are still expected to perform 
(Rutland, 1994). Another fairly well survived feature is the 
authoritarian managerial style, which manifests itself in manager-
centred decision-making and inefficient delegation (Suutari, 1996; 
Gurkov, 1998). A third feature to survive is the central role of 
managers’ personal relations in the post-Soviet business culture.  
 
According to a Russian manager “personal relationships are 90 per 
cent of the business” (Bäckman, 1997, 43). The existence of the 
relations dating from the Soviet era has been supported by the 
turbulence of the market, which is why enterprise managers, at the 
first stages of the economic transformation in particular, resorted to 
their old relationships rather than taking risks by forming new 
business contacts (Salmi, 1995). Along with the development of the 
external business environment, the role of personal relations has 
weakened and, more than on relationships, emphasis is now placed on 
the partner’s liquidity. Kharkhordin and Gerber (1994, 1081) 
illustrates such change by citing a Russian manager; “I do not care 
who they are if they pre-pay the delivery”.  
 
Some of the latest writings indicate that the friendship network is 
loosing its grip in the post-Soviet business culture, as managers are 
increasingly using official agreements, mergers or formal alliances. 
For example, Lehmbruch (1999, 5) suggests that “… there is little 
evidence of ‘clan’-style ‘directors’ networks’ based on direct personal 
trust. Rather, economic actors prefer a two-pronged strategy of 
dealing with environmental uncertainty: While attempting to minimize 
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they also hedge their exposure by maintaining multiple, often loose 
outside affiliations”. 
 
Although the personal relation network was extremely important in 
the Soviet enterprise management, this friendship network has not 
ever been and it will not ever be an intrinsic value in the enterprise 
management. In the Soviet era, the personal network secured the 
enterprise management against the imperfect operation of the 
centrally planned economy whereas the contemporary network acts as 
a business insurance to ensure the reliability of a business partner in 
highly turbulent environment.  
 
Despite turbulence in the business networks, political, administrative 
and economic élite of the Soviet period has maintained rather well its 
position in the contemporary business circles especially in those 
former Soviet republics were reforms and market forces have not 
managed to flush the old Soviet friendship network away. In these 
less market oriented ex-Soviet republics, the economic system change 
has rather enlarged the business élite than removed decision-making 
power entirely from the Soviet élite (Liuhto, 1999d). 
  
Although some of the Soviet managerial methods seem to have 
survived, empirical observations also indicate that some aspects of 
Management Sovieticus have changed considerably. Salmi (1995) 
states that post-Soviet managers are shifting focus from production 
efficiency to overall organisational effectiveness. This finding 
indicates that the post-Soviet managers have moved from internal 
production management towards more comprehensive business 
thinking.  
 
Similarly, a number of researchers point also out that managers have 
become less production-centred as they have started to pay more 
attention to marketing and finance (Klaamann, 1992; Nurmi and 
Üksvarav, 1993; Üksvarav and Nurmi, 1993; Klaamann, 1994; 
Gurkov, 1998). For example, Gurkov (1998, 1) states that “ … 
corporate executives [Russian] are moving far away from the 
traditional Soviet paternalistic and production-oriented management 
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managers nor workers, do not accept such a movement’”.  
 
As Gurkov’s view above brings up the disagreement about the 
transition between the top management and the rest of the company, 
also other research findings show that attitudes towards change are 
not homogenous in the post-Soviet enterprises. It has been suggested 
that the top management of companies have fairly open attitudes to 
change, whereas the lower management and workers tend to show 
less enthusiasm towards change (Clarke et al., 1994; Migliore et al., 
1996; Gustavsson and Ljung, 1998; Liuhto, 1998b). In addition to 
differences between various organisation levels, the literature review 
also indicates increasing divergence in organisational behaviour 
between various post-Soviet republics (Jerschina and Gorniak, 1997), 
though some similarities are still visible in leadership styles (Suutari, 
1996).  
 
Due to growing divergence between ex-Soviet republics, the 
following apt characterisation of the Russian leadership style does not 
apply to the rest of the FSU, though some features can still be traced 
in the management culture of some former Soviet republics. “The 
aggregate profile of the Russian leader … provides a picture of a 
contradictory person, with a visible tough autocratic style and 
decisive behavior, ability to make individual decisions and assume 
responsibility for these decisions. The leader is autonomous, not 
relying strongly on teamwork, not trying to save face, and acting 
openly, quickly and quite competently in the Russian unstable and 
risky environment. He/she is not highly performance oriented, being 
at the same time status conscious. However, this assertive manner 
and the way he/she acts in an uncertain economy with the lack of 
future vision, does not make the individual a strong charismatic 
leader” (Hisrich and Gratchev, 1999, 14).  
 
If the organisational and managerial transition in the FSU is 
approached from the theory building perspective, it can noticed that a 
comprehensive theory explaining organisational and managerial 
transition has not been designed by the end of the millennium. Even if 
a comprehensive theory has not been created yet, Shama (1994b) has 
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market economy, which takes also into account the microeconomic 
transition. Although the model can be characterised more as a 
description of occurred re-orientations rather than a complete 
explanation of causal relationships between these re-orientations, this 
model describes aptly the multidimensional and the comprehensive 
nature of the transition (see Figure 2).  
 
To conclude, the main observations of the literature review on the 
organisational and managerial transition in the FSU can be 
summarised as follows. First of all, the ownership structure does not 
necessarily determine the organisational and managerial success, 
although ownership presumably does have a strong influence on 
changes. Second, even if company’s strategic response to the 
revolutionarily changed business environment is a pre-condition to 
organisational success, a lack of strategic management thinking is not 
uncommon among post-Soviet companies. Third, well-designed 
business and adequately modified education and managerial training 
are required to aid post-Soviet enterprises to avoid ad hoc re-
orientations and secure organisational competitiveness in the long run. 
 
Fourth, the different position of companies in relation to the central 
planning should be acknowledged in the study of the organisational 
and managerial transformation, since the organisational restructuring 
does not necessarily demand the same managerial skills than building 
a new organisational entity from scratch. Fifth, the post-Soviet 
companies have inherited features of Management Sovieticus, which 
draws attention to the ability to de-memorise the unsuitable Soviet 
managerial practices. Sixth, empirical studies indicate that certain 
aspects of management seem to have transformed while some others 
have preserved features of Management Sovieticus, sometimes by 
managers’ conscious choice or because of organisational inertia.  
 
Seventh, foreign managers operating in the FSU are sometimes forced 
to adopt features of Management Sovieticus, and therefore, they do 
not automatically distribute Western management practices in the ex-
Soviet Union. Eighth, the organisational and managerial 
transformation seems to be progressing at a different speed and 
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recovery of business ethics from the unhealthy heritage of the 
Management Sovieticus should be supported, since without change in 
deeper level of an enterprise the transition remains superficial. Tenth, 
cultural features of nation-states and regions are increasingly 
manifested in the post-Soviet enterprise management, and therefore, 
relatively homogeneous Management Sovieticus has disintegrated to 
many distinctive national and regional management cultures.  
 
The following table presents almost 150 studies concerning 
organisational and managerial change in the former Soviet Union (see 
Table 3). The table is by no means a comprehensive presentation of 
all important contributions in the research field. These studies have 
been named as examples of investigations concerning the 
organisational and managerial transformation in the FSU. Even if the 
list does not include all notable studies, the table may provide with a 
fast access to some interesting empirical researches. 
 
4.  Some Suggestions for Future Research  
 
Earlier studies have strengthened the basis of understanding 
organisational and managerial transformation in the FSU. However, 
some of these researches suffer from a rather inadequate 
methodology, as they tend to study post-Soviet enterprise and its 
management only at one particular point in time. Regardless of such a 
cross section approach, they sometimes draw very strong conclusions 
on the transformation. As the previous empirical studies have not 
reached unambiguous conclusions, it would be essential to conduct 
further research on the following themes: 
 
(1)  Analysis of the transition phases and tracks of various enterprise 
populations in the FSU, as research could help in focusing the 
enterprise support. 
(2)    A detailed study on investment behaviour, as intensified and 
adequately focused investment activity is the fundamental 
source of economic growth and development.  
(3)  The change of top-management team and its impact on 
organisational transformation, as research could pinpoint the 
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performance.  
(4)  A detailed study on the impact of foreign influence (foreign 
ownership, foreign management team and foreign trade 
activities) on organisational effectiveness, as contemporary 
findings on the relationship between foreign influence and 
enterprise performance are not unambiguous yet. 
(5)  Thorough analysis on changes in business network and inter-
enterprise relations, as it seems that the transition of the 
enterprise web plays a crucial role in the overall transformation. 
(6)  A comprehensive research on enterprise financing, as it would 
be of utmost importance to distribute the scarce aid and funding 
to the most promising companies.  
(7)  A detailed study on the relationship between private ownership 
and enterprise success, as the previous research has not 
produced unambiguous results on this issue, which can be 
regarded as the core of the transformation from socialism to 
capitalism. 
(8)  Designing comparative competitiveness analysis for the post-
Soviet companies, as a comparative competitiveness scheme 
could create a more solid basis for evaluating ex-Soviet 
companies and offering foreign and national aid to truly 
competitive enterprises.  
(9)  A large survey on inter-enterprise payments, as the economic 
crisis in the former Soviet Union has created enormous inter-
enterprise arrears. Research could offer a solution to escape 
from the vicious circle of inter-enterprise arrears.  
(10)  A longitudinal study on the ‘soft sides’ of post-Soviet 
enterprises, such as development of business ethics and 
managerial values, would be necessary since without change in 
these ‘invisible’ parts of an organisation the transformation of 
‘hard’ aspects of the enterprise management remains artificial. 
 
It seems appropriate to start finishing this report with the words of the 
Estonian academic, Raoul Üksvarav (1991, 11) who stated on the eve 
of the disintegration of the Soviet empire as follows; “There have 
been, and still are several theories and practices on how to go from 
capitalism to socialism. They have all, actually failed more or less so 
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socialism to capitalism”.  
 
As a comprehensive theory on organisational and managerial 
transformation has not been designed yet despite almost 10 years of 
transition, both quantitative and qualitative empirical studies on the 
issues mentioned above would contribute considerably to theory 
building. However, the uniqueness paradox should be taken into 
consideration when theories and models on the organisational and 
managerial transition are built. In other words, although the 
transformation at the system level is indisputably unique in the history 
of mankind, the author believes that the impact of the economic 
system change, at the enterprise level, is not necessarily so unique, as 
it resembles profound and enterprise population-wide re-orientation, 
which occurs in an extremely turbulent business environment.  
 
In fact, the views stressing the complete uniqueness of the 
transformation at the enterprise level would argue, at least implicitly, 
that the logic behind organisational and managerial behaviour in 
transition economies is significantly different from the organisational 
and managerial logic in market economies, which is not so easy to 
believe in. Therefore, explanations for differences in enterprise 
behaviour between transition economies and in advanced market 
economies should not necessarily be searched for at the economic 
system level but at the enterprise level.  
 
For example, the organisation cultural approach might aid to discover 
the main factors for these differences in management behaviour. In 
other words, cultural approach stressing the importance of the heritage 
of the socialist organisation culture in understanding the 
contemporary enterprise behaviour may be a more important 
determinant in explaining differences between the post-socialist 
companies and enterprises operating in advanced market economies 
than the economic system change per se.  
 
Although transition economies would not require unique 
microeconomic theories, it should be stressed that the organisational 
and managerial change in transition economies is much more 
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enterprise population and even the whole society are transforming. 
Despite the profoundness and the comprehensiveness of the 
transformation, it can be argued that change at the enterprise level is 
more transition-specific than completely unique and therefore allows 
academics to use ‘Western’ theories and models on the organisational 
and managerial change to the microeconomic transition of the post-
socialist economies.  
 
So far, scholars have been relatively passive in combining Western 
theories on organisational change and Eastern empirical data, though 
advantages of such integration seem obvious. Hopefully, the 
contribution of integrating Western theories and Eastern data is 
recognised more often in future research efforts, as the integration 
would most probably lead to accelerated accumulation of 
understanding on the organisational and managerial transformation in 
the FSU and in the rest of the former socialist bloc. In fact, 
appropriately balanced combination of Western theories and Eastern 
data might enable scholars to build a theoretical bridge between the 
East and the West, and hence, to support the integration of the post-
socialist companies into the global business world. 
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1.  Deficiencies in the statistical material and the deteriorated 
comparability of the statistics in the post-Soviet republics should 
be taken into consideration when statistical data is presented in 
this article.  
 
2.  It needs to be noticed that a great share of foreign owned 
companies does not operate, though they have been registered. 
For example in Russia, more than 45,000 enterprises have been 
registered while only some 15,000 operate on permanent basis 
in 1998 (RSC, 1999). 
 
3.  According to Fitch Ibca organisation, the capital flight from 
Russia was USD 136 billion during 1993-1998 (Kauppalehti, 
1999). Should this estimate be correct, it would mean that the 
capital flight from Russia is almost 15 times the FDI inflow to 
Russia (EBRD, 1998). This inflow-outflow analysis indicates 
clearly that attracting foreign capital is a less significant policy 
measure to increase investment capital in Russia than creating 
business environment, which would strengthen Russian 
capitalists’ belief in the opportunities offered by their home 
market. 
 
4.  Kleiner (1994) describes also the impact of the post-Soviet 
reforms on the enterprise management in Russia. These reforms 
have not been presented here, as this section does not deal with 
the post-Soviet changes. 
 
5.  In this context, it should be stressed that the Soviet management 
can be regarded as relatively homogeneous until the Perestroika 
era, when the differences started to become wider and more 
visible. 
 
6.  The research refers to no comparative management studies, as 
their contribution here is not very significant. Many of them are 
methodologically inadequate. Furthermore, they tend to 
compare the management of enterprises in different countries 
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of comparison is largely based on descriptions of management 
instead of reasons behind these managerial differences. 
However, some writings can be illustrative, such as Richman, 
(1965), Granick (1972), Banai and Levicki (1988), Lawrence 
and Vlachoutsicos (1990), and Kiezun (1991).  
 
7.  The reflection of management theories on Soviet enterprise 
management can be summed up by stating that, during Lenin, 
management theories were based on socialist Taylorism, which 
was founded on a strict, ‘scientifically’ determined division of 
labour and the political loyalty of the employees. Inspired by 
socialist  Taylorism, Bogdanow developed the theory of 
Tektology and Kerzhentsev the theory of Scientific Labour 
Organization. During Stalin, management theories were 
considered unsuitable for the operations of Soviet enterprises. 
This explains the neglect and ad hoc measures, which were 
applied to enterprise management (Gorelik, 1975; Kiezun, 
1991). After Stalin’s era, the Soviet Union again began to utilise 
some managerial practices which were also used in the West, 
such as the system approach in enterprise management 
(Conyngham, 1982). Although there is quite a considerable 
amount of organisation studies published in the Soviet Union 
after Stalin (Beissinger, 1988), they are principally normative 
system descriptions rather than analyses of real managerial 
behaviour. In addition to normativeness, the reliability of Soviet 
studies can be questioned as it was not rare for researchers to 
publish results that pleased their employers or even to distort the 
findings (Bauer et al., 1959; Shlapentokh, 1989; Dewhirst and 
Farrell, 1973). Given the normativeness and potential 
unreliability of organisation studies published in the Soviet 
Union, this research is mainly based on studies published 
outside the Soviet Union. 
 
8.  In practice, the Soviet-type planned economy was more 
vertically than horizontally integrated. In other words, the 
enterprises were closely linked to the administrative organs 
  48above them, but fairly loosely linked to the operations of other 
enterprises (Conyngham, 1982).  
 
9.  The operation of the Soviet industrial enterprise was governed in 
almost every respect by the techpromfinplan (technical-
industrial-financial plan). This plan was annual (semi-annual, 
quarterly, monthly) subplan of long-term (five- to seven-year) 
perspective plans (Gregory and Stuart, 1981). 
 
10.  When the functioning of the reward system is evaluated, “one 
must not leave unnoticed that ‘bonuses’ had gradually ceased to 
be an extra payment and become something regular as a normal 
wage (the first signs of this phenomenon were noticed by 
Granick as early as 1960) … The impact of bonuses being only 
marginal, the importance of non-cash incentives can be 
expected to increase. Owing to the bureaucratic nature of the 
relationship within management hierarchies in a command 
economy, to behave rationally for the manager would imply 
maximising his status. Here under status we understand power, 
privileges and career opportunities. The importance of status 
followed from the fact that an individual was evaluated and 
rewarded according to the position occupied in a hierarchy” 
(Kuznetsov, 1994, 961). 
 
11.  The term ‘non-legal’ refers here to activity which is in principle 
illegal but unofficially approved by the central planning. This is 
to say that the officials did not interfere in the unofficial 
activities of the enterprise if it could hence fulfil its plans. 
However, some measures were not allowed even unofficially 
and they were regarded as illegal (Millar, 1988). 
 
12.  Enterprise autarky was increased particularly in the 1970’s. An 
indication of the increased autarky was that 18,000 enterprises 
had joined the industrial associations by 1981 (Beissinger, 
1988).  
 
13.  As planning the activities and controlling a large number of 
small enterprises would have been a complicated task, the 
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large enterprises. Another reason besides controlling enterprises 
was the economies of scale thinking, which emphasised large 
production units in increasing efficiency. These are two main 
reasons why the company size was considerably larger in the 
centrally planned economies than in market economies 
(Kuznetsov, 1994; Ickes and Ryterman, 1997). 
 
14.  Some scholars define managerial troika slightly differently. For 
example, Kivinen (1988) suggests that managerial troika 
consisted of enterprise management (managerial troika), party 
organisation, and labour union. 
 
15.  The managers of Soviet enterprises attempted to minimise their 
risks while acting within the framework of the official system. 
Despite this risk-aversion, ‘red entrepreneurs’ operating in the 
shadow economy were ready to risk even their personal freedom 
in practices that were legal in market economies but sanctioned 
in the Soviet economy (Hisrich and Gratcev, 1993). According 
to Kusnezova (1999, 60), “until 1987 entrepreneurship was 
considered to be crime”. 
 
16.  The legislative foundations for producers’ co-operatives were 
formulated during 1986-1988 (Linz, 1988; Plokker, 1990). 
Producers’ co-operatives should not be mixed up with collective 
farms  (kolkhoz) operating in agriculture, because they were 
practically operating under the central planning. Foreigners from 
capitalist countries had had a right to establish subsidiaries in 
the Soviet Union since 1987. The joint venture act of 1987 was 
especially directed at companies coming from the capitalistic 
countries because the enterprises of the socialist countries had 
already had a right to found subsidiaries in the Soviet Union 
since 1982. Despite this right, enterprises from socialist 
countries had not been very enthusiastic about establishing joint 
ventures in the Soviet Union before the act of 1987 (Matejka, 
1988). As a result of allowing new types of enterprises in the 
Soviet Union, some 200,000 producers’ co-operatives, 1000 
foreign-owned, and 2,400 leased enterprises were registered by 
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Filatotchev et al., 1992; Laurila, 1993). 
 
17.  A large number of quotations is presented in this section to offer 
colourful and apt descriptions of the essential empirical findings.  
 
18.  However, some other scholars have found that there is no 
constant linkage between the employee ownership and weak 
performance. For example, Jones and Mygind (1998, 1) state 
that “the key obstacle to enhance performance does not appear 
to be employee ownership [in Estonia]”. 
 
19.  For example, the share of Cyprus was some 12 per cent of the 
FDI inflow to Russia in 1998. Most probably, Russian 
capitalists are behind these extensive investment flows from 
Cyprus to Russia (RSC, 1999).  
 
20.  This finding is based on the interviews of joint venture 
managers in 1991 and 1992 (Liuhto, 1991; Liuhto, 1993a). 
  51Table 1:  Some Consequences of the Soviet Reforms to the Enterprise Management 
 
Period  Cause of Changes  Type of   Main Independent  Conventional 
     Management  Units    Name  of  Period 
 
40s-50s  Industrial  management  Centralized  State    “Command   
  reform  1940-41        Economy” 
 
End of the 50s-  Krushchev’s 1957   Regional  Regional committees  “Regional 
mid 60s  economic reform       of national economy  Decentralization” 
 
Mid 60s-  Brezhnev’s 1965   Industrial  Industrial ministries  “Ministerial  
mid  70s  economic  reforms      Administrative 
          C o m m a n d   P l a n n i n g ”  
 
Mid 70s -  Brezhnev’s 1973   Subindustrial  Main boards of     “Departmental   
mid  80s  industrial  management    ministries,  all-union  Administrative 
  reforms         Command  Planning” 
 
  Various schemes of      All-Union industrial 
  industrial  management    corporations 
 
Mid 80s-1992  Gorbachev’s Perestroika  Enterprise  Large enterprises,    “All-Union  
  reforms, state enterprise    corporations    Industrial 
  law  of  1987     enterprises   Combines”  VPO 
 
 
Source:  Kleiner (1994, 112) 
 
 
  52Table 2: Characteristics of Management in Privately-Owned and State-Owned 
Companies 
 
Managers of Private Companies    Managers of State-Owned Companies 
 
Younger      Older 
Professional education   Nomenklatura 
Pro-change, hopeful for future    Anti-change, look to past 
Sales  background     Engineering  background 
Active, fast to act        Passive, slow to act 
Flexible,  open  minded     Rigid,  closed-minded 
Problem  solvers     Stick  to  plan 
Order-givers      Order-takers 
Businessmen      Party  men 
Entrepreneurial,  risk-takers    Conservative,  risk-aversive 
Strategic, externally oriented     Operations focused, inside people 
Market  oriented     Plan  oriented 
Consumer oriented      Production  oriented 
Rely on market signals      Rely on personal contacts 
Price according to market demand    Price according to costs 
Use promotional tools       No use for promotion 
Use more efficient distribution    Distribution is state-dictated 
Pay  for  performance     Pay  for  grade 
Speak languages of markets      Speak language of past markets 
Source:  Shama (1993, 31) 
  53Table 3:   Some Studies Concerning Organisational and Managerial Change  
    in the Former Soviet Union 
 
Main Theme   Author/s (publication year) Country Focused On 
 
Ownership Transformation,  von Hirschhausen & Hui (1995) the Baltic States 
Restructuring and Other  Frydman et al. (1993) the Baltic States, Russia &Ukraine  
Organisational Arrangements Djankov  (1998) the CIS 
 Nellis  (1996)  Estonia 
  Filatotchev et al. (1992/1996); Hendley (1992); Ash & Hare (1994); Brown et al. (1994);  
  Clarke et al. (1994); Rutland (1994); Vacroux (1994); Boycko et al. (1995);  
  Buck et al. (1995/1996); Freinkman (1995); McCarthy & Puffer (1995); Radygin (1995); Tsenzharik 
(1995); Zilcken (1995); Barberis et al. (1996); Boycko (1996);  
  Earle & Estrin (1996/1997); Earle & Rose (1996); Schleifer & Vasiliev (1996);  
  Shekshnia & Puffer (1996); Brown (1997); Duflo & Senik-Leygenie (1997);  
  Ickes & Ryterman (1997); Kalmi (1997); Scott (1997); Healey & Lekslin (1998);  
  Wright et al. (1998) Russia 
  Hare et al. (1996); Akimova & Schwödiauer (1998) Ukraine 
 
Enterprise Performance  Mygind (1997); Liuhto (1999b) the Baltic States      
  Jones & Mygind (1998); Purju (1998) Estonia 
  Kuztnetsov & Kuznetsova (1996); Richter & Schaffer (1996); Fey & Denison (1998) Russia 
 
Business Environment and  Üksvarav & Nurmi (1993); Gustavsson & Ljung (1998); Liuhto (1998b/1999a);  
Organisational Adjustments   Tammeraid et al. (1999); Vensel (1999) Estonia  
and Re-orientations  Dent (1994); Golden et al. (1995); Krueger (1995); Kabalina et al. (1996);  
  Varshavskaya & Donova (1996); Bruton & Rubanik (1997); Gurkov et al. (1997); Linz (1997);  
  Hendley (1998); Mills & Polonsky (1998); Richey et al. (1998) Russia     
Corporate Governance,   Kustin (1998) Belarus  
Management and Leadership  Liuhto (1996) Estonia  
 Suutari  (1996)  Estonia & Russia 
  Kozminski (1993); Puffer & McCarthy (1993); Shama (1993/1994b); Welsh et al. (1993);  
  Kuznetsov (1994); Longenecker & Popovski (1994); Puffer (1994); Shekshnia (1994);  
  Frydman et al. (1995); Pistor (1995); Melin (1996); Romanov (1996); Blasi (1997);  
  Gurkov (1998); Matthews & Yeghiazarian (1998) Russia 
   
Management Education,   Greer (1995); Radosevic (1997) the Baltic States 
Training and Development Elenurm  (1999)  Estonia 
  Zhuplev & Kozhakhmetov (1997) Kazakhstan      
  Puffer (1993); Kozlova & Puffer (1994); Wiley (1994); Hisrich & Gratchev (1995) Russia  
 
Organisational Learning  Nurmi & Üksvarav (1993); Nieminen & Törnroos (1996) Estonia 
  Gurkov & Kuzminov (1995); Kuznetsov (1995); Nieminen (1997/1999) Russia 
 
Investment Behaviour  Zilcken (1997) Latvia 
 
Business Ethics  Kharkhordin (1994); Kharkhordin & Gerber (1994); Puffer & McCarthy (1995);  
  Hisrich & Gratchev (1999) Russia 
 
Organisation Cultural Aspects   Jerschina & Gorniak (1997) the Baltic States, Belarus, Russia & Ukraine  
and Business Philosophy  Liuhto (1997a); Vadi & Buono (1997) Estonia 
  Urnov et al. (1993); Migliore et al. (1996); Puffer et al. (1996); Ralston et al. (1997);  
  Holden et al. (1998); Vlachoutsicos (1998); Kusnezova (1999) Russia 
 
Personal Relationships and  Salmi (1995/1996); Lehtinen (1996); Bäckman (1997); Rizoupolous (1997); Ledeneva (1998); 
Networks in Business  Boiko & Tsenzharik (1999); Lehmbruch (1999) Russia 
  
Market Entry, Strategies and   Hirvensalo (1996) the Baltic States & Russia  
Operations of Foreign Companies   Borsos (1994); Nieminen & Törnroos (1995); Törnroos (1996); Ziacik (1998/1999) Estonia 
in the FSU  Suutari (1998); Nieminen & Larimo (1999) Estonia & Russia 
 Franko  (1996)  Lithuania, Russia & Ukraine  
  Cattaneo (1992); Jermakowicz & Jermakowicz (1993); Lawrence & Vlachoutsicos (1993);  
  Hamill & Versun (1996); Thornton & Mikheeva (1996); Anderson et al. (1997);  
  Arenkov & Rakhmatullina (1999); Sutyrin & Trofimenko (1999) Russia 
  Bridgewater et al. (1995) Ukraine 
 
Internationalisation of Post-Soviet  Sôrg & Ivanova (1999) Estonia 
Companies   Liuhto (1998a) Russia 
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  55Figure 2:  A Model of Transformation from a Planned Economy to a Market  
   Economy 
 
   COMMAND  TRANSITION  MARKET 
   ECONOMY    ECONOMY 
Political Totalitarianism  Democratization  Democracy 
   One party system  Multi-party system  Economics drive politics 
    Limited human rights  Human rights  Politics: authoritative 
    Censorship  Free speech  resource allocated  Compulsory  elections
 Free  elections  Interest  groups 
   Extensive  regulations  Constitution  PACS 
   Static 
   Bureaucratic     
Economic Central  planning  Marketization  Free  markets 
   State monopoly  Increased competition  Competitive strategy 
    Price controls/subsidies  Increased inflation  Competitive pricing 
    State owned means of production  Increased uncertainty  Introduced new products 
    Production oriented  Frequent price adjustments  Eliminated some products 
    No competition  Selective consumers  Reduced production 
    No consumer choice  Need to modify products  Increased promotion 
    Politically oriented closed markets  Need to export  Increased exports 
    No official employment  Inadequate distribution  Obtained foreign investment 
    Supply < demand -> shortage  Need for business skills  Become a smaller enterprise 
     etc.   
      Supply & demand  Supply = demand 
 
Socio/   Socialism   Individualism  Capitalism 
Cultural   ver individual    Individual effort  Income inequality  Society o
   Even earnings    Income inequality  Social safety nets 
    Minimum wages    Low minimum wages  Socialeconomic differentiation 
    Free education    Low support for education  Market dictates social perception 
    Free medical care    Low support for medical care  Increased social ills: e.g. crime 
    One class society    Increased crime rates  and homelessness 
       Social  differentiation 
 
 COMMAND  TRANSITION  MARKET 
 ECONOMY    ECONOMY 














Marketization impacts    Adjustments to free markets 
----------------------- 
Perceived level of market economy 
---------------------------------- 
Increased competition    Restructured the enterprise 
Consumers have become more selective  Changed legal status of enterprise 
Credit is more difficult to get    Become a smaller enter 
Inventories have increased    Developed a more competitive strategy
Raw materials are difficult to get    Eliminated some product lines 
Prices of raw materials have gone up rapidly  Introduced new products 
Many employees have left the enterprise  Priced products more competitively 
Business uncertainty has increased    Increased use of sales force 
Increased nervousness among employees  Used more credit 
Inadequate distribution of products    Increased promotion and advertising 
Prices have to be adjusted more frequently  Become more efficient 
Products are difficult to sell    Reduced production 
Increased need to export    Reduced average production costs 
Increased need for marketing skills    Increased exports to the West 
Increased need for marketing research  Started looking for foreign investors 
Increased need for business education    Obtained foreign investment 
Need for product modification    Increased distribution of products 
Need to introduce new products    Reduced the number of employees 
Less political influence on the enterprise  Declared bankruptcy 
Severe cash flow problems
 Marketization  Free markets 
  Increased competition  Competitive strategy 
  Increased inflation  Competitive pricing 
  Increased uncertainty  Introduced new products 
  Frequent price adjustments  Eliminated some products 
 Selective  consumers  Reduced  production 
  Need to modify products  Increased promotion 
  Need to export    Increased exports 
  Inadequate distribution  Obtained foreign investment 
  Need for business skills  Become a smaller enterprise 
 etc.      Privatization 
Supply & demand Supply = demand 
Source:  Shama (1994b, 302-304) 
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